Salesforce

Your customer data lives in Salesforce.
Its security lives in a config nobody has attacked.

Salesforce holds your pipeline, your customers, and your most sensitive records, and its security rests on a sharing model, permissions, and integrations that are easy to get wrong. SpartanX tests that configuration the way an attacker after your data would.

Sharing and permissionsIntegrations and APIsExploit-validated
The problem

The breach is in the configuration, not the platform

Salesforce is secure by design and misconfigured in practice. Over-broad profiles, a permissive sharing model, exposed APIs, and third-party integrations with too much trust are where customer data actually leaks, and none of it shows up on a traditional scan.

The people who target Salesforce go after the configuration and the connections, not the platform itself. Reviewing permissions on a spreadsheet does not tell you what an attacker could chain together. Only trying it does.

How it works

Attack the org, not the brochure

01

Map the org

The platform models your Salesforce configuration: profiles, the sharing model, permissions, and the integrations wired into it.

02

Prove the exposure

An autonomous adversary tests whether permissions, sharing, and connected apps can be chained into real access to data, confirming each with a working path.

03

Chain to identity

Salesforce findings are chained with the identity and access around them, because an over-trusted login is often the first step in.

04

Report with evidence

Each finding is proven and prioritized by the sensitivity of what it exposes, ready for the team that owns the org.

The outcome

Know your org is tight, with proof

Configuration tested like an attacker

You learn what your profiles, sharing, and integrations actually allow, not what they were meant to allow.

Data exposure made concrete

Findings connect to the specific records and processes they put at risk, so the stakes are obvious.

Integrations in scope

The connected apps and APIs around Salesforce are tested as part of the path, not left as someone else's problem.
Stop guessing about

Whether the sharing model and integrations protecting your customer data would hold up to an attacker who actually tried to chain them.

Salesforce configuration, sharing, and integrations tested as one surface.
Access to data proven by a working path, not inferred from a permission review.
Findings chained to the identity that reaches the org.

Attack your Salesforce before someone else does

See whether the configuration guarding your customer data can take a real adversary.